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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 51Abstract: 
This paper estimates the effects of exogenous fiscal policy shocks in Spain 
in a VAR framework. Government expenditure expansionary shocks are 
found to have positive effects on output in the short-term at the cost of 
higher inflation and public deficits and lower output in the medium and long 
term. Tax increases are found to drag economic activity in the medium term 
while entailing an only temporary improvement of the public budget 
balance. The application of these results to the analysis of fiscal policy in 
Spain since the mid-nineties points to the conclusion that the consolidation 
process does not seem to have involved costs in terms of output growth. 
Moreover, the stance of fiscal policy has become more counter-cyclical in 
that period. 
JEL Classification no.: E62, H30 
Keywords: VAR; Fiscal Shocks; Fiscal multipliers. 
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The role of fiscal policy in influencing economic activity has been one of 
the most extensively discussed issues by both academics and policy-makers. 
A renewed emphasis on this issue has recently been observed in the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), where fiscal policy emerges as the only 
instrument on the demand side in the hands of Member States to offset 
idiosyncratic shocks.  
        Despite this relevance, the empirical evidence does not provide a 
common picture. In particular, although most of the recent literature shows 
positive short-term output multipliers stemming from public expenditure 
is very disperse. There is even some evidence of negative fiscal multipliers 
for some OECD countries in the post-1980 period, and a recent stream of 
the literature has found positive output responses following fiscal 
retrenchments, under certain circumstances. 
    Against this background, this paper aims at providing evidence for the 
case of Spain on the effects of fiscal policy shocks on a set of key 
macroeconomic variables. Our results show that increases in government 
expenditure have a positive impact on economic growth in the short term, 
while the effect turns negative in the longer term. Moreover, net-tax 
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increases and tax cuts, the estimated magnitude and duration of these effects 
Non-technical Abstract  
increases produce negative responses on output in the medium term. As 
regards the effect on prices, government expenditure shocks yield 
significant effects on prices of the same sign, and net-tax increases yield 
negative short-term price responses. Both government expenditure and net-
tax increases generate public deficits in the medium term. Finally, the 
responses of GDP or prices are found to differ significantly depending on 
the spending or tax component considered.  
    Two main policy conclusions could be drawn from these results. Firstly, 
fiscal policy is able to stimulate economic activity through expenditure 
expansions at the cost of higher inflation and public deficits and lower 
output in the medium term. In this respect, the fiscal policy implemented in 
Spain since the mid-nineties seems to have contributed to create, from a 
medium-term perspective, better conditions for economic growth, and the 
consolidation process applied in this period does not seem to have involved 
significant costs in terms of output growth. Furthermore, the stance of fiscal 
policy has also become more counter-cyclical since the late nineties. 
    Secondly, attempts to achieve fiscal consolidation by increasing the tax 
burden might fail to succeed and, given the dynamic interrelations between 
public revenues and expenditure, are likely to involve even higher deficits in 
the future. Last, but not least, such a policy might slow economic activity 
down in the medium term. 
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1 
The role of fiscal policy in influencing economic activity has been one of 
the most extensively discussed issues by both academics and policy-makers. 
A renewed emphasis on this issue has recently been observed in the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), where fiscal policy emerges as the only 
instrument on the demand side in the hands of Member States to offset 
idiosyncratic shocks.  
    Despite this relevance, we know surprisingly very little about the effects 
of fiscal policy on economic activity (Perotti, 2001). From a theoretical 
point of view, the sign and magnitude of the impact of discretionary fiscal 
policy on aggregate demand depend on a number of key assumptions
1, with 
different models offering often opposite conclusions.  
    The  empirical  evidence  does  not  provide a common picture either. In 
particular, although most of the recent literature, based either on structural 
macro models or on VAR analysis, shows positive short-term output 
multipliers stemming from public expenditure increases and tax cuts, the 
estimated magnitude and duration of these effects is very disperse (see 
Table 1 for a brief summary of the effects of fiscal policy shocks on GDP 
and prices in selected VAR studies). There is even some evidence of 
                                                 
1 Including, inter alia, the existence of nominal rigidities in the economy, the elasticity of  
the labour supply, the interest-rate elasticity of investment, the interest-rate and income 
elasticities of money demand, the degree of openness of the economy, the exchange-rate 
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Introduction  
negative fiscal multipliers for some OECD countries in the post-1980 period 
(Perotti, 2004). In addition, a recent stream of the literature that aims at 
explaining the economic effects of fiscal consolidations has found, under 
certain circumstances, positive output responses following fiscal 
retrenchments, the so-called non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy 
(Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; European Commission, 2003; Perotti, 1999)
2. 
    Against this background, this paper aims at providing evidence for the 
case of Spain on the effects of exogenous fiscal policy shocks on a set of 
key macroeconomic variables within a VAR framework.  Most of the recent 
existing evidence on the responses to fiscal policy shocks relies indeed on 
SVAR models, with the main differences among papers coming from the 
alternative approaches followed to identify the fiscal policy shocks. These 
approaches can be summarised in four (Perotti, 2004): (1) identification of 
fiscal policy shocks by using dummy variables that capture specific 
episodes such as the military build-ups corresponding to the Korean and the 
Vietnam wars or the Reagan fiscal expansion in the case of the US 
(Burnside et al., 1999; Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Edelberg et al., 1998); (2) 
imposition of sign restrictions on the impulse-response functions 
(Mountford and Uhlig, 2002); (3) identification of fiscal shocks based on a 
                                                                                                                            
regime, the magnitude of the wealth effects, the presence of forward-looking agents and, 
more generally, the role played by rational expectations. 
2 See also Giudice et al. (2003) for a synthesis of the theoretical arguments behind the non-
Keynesian effects along with a useful compilation of the relevant empirical evidence. 
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Choleski ordering (Favero, 2002; Fatás and Mihov, 2001); (4) and finally, 
identification of fiscal policy shocks by exploiting decision lags in policy 
making and information about the elasticity of fiscal variables to economic 
activity (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2004). This latter approach is 
the one we follow in this paper. In this respect, our results add to the 
previous evidence on the same topic already available for Spain obtained 
with alternative identification schemes (De Castro, 2005; Marcellino, 2002).  
    The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes the data 
and addresses the methodological issues related to the specification and 
identification of the VAR; section 3 presents the results stemming from 
expenditure shocks, whereas section 4 focuses on the effects of shocks to 
net taxes; section 5 analyses the robustness of the results, section 6 includes 
an application of our results to the analysis of the contribution of fiscal 
policy to GDP growth in Spain since the mid-nineties and, finally, section 7 
concludes.  
 
2  Methodological issues 
2.1  The VAR specification 
Our benchmark specification of the VAR includes quarterly data on public 
expenditure (gt), net taxes (tt) and GDP (yt) in real terms
3, the GDP deflator 
                                                 
3 In all cases the GDP deflator is employed so as to obtain the corresponding real values. 
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(pt) and the three-year interest rate of government bonds (rt)
4. gt is defined 
as the sum of public consumption
5 and public investment, whereas tt 
includes public revenues net of transfers
6, excluding interest payments on 
government debt. Thus the general government primary budget balance is 
obtained as the difference between the levels of tt and gt. All variables are 
seasonally adjusted and enter in logs except the interest rate, which enters in 
levels. The sample covers the period 1980:1-2004:4
7. 
    The reduced-form VAR can be written as  
t t t U X L D X + = −1 ) (         ( 1 )  
where Xt ≡ (gt, tt, yt, pt, rt) is the vector of endogenous variables. The only 
deterministic component is a constant term and D(L) is an autoregressive lag 










t u u u u u   ,   ,   ,   , ) contains the reduced-form 
residuals, which in general will have non-zero correlations. Model (1) is 
estimated by OLS and the number of lags was set to five according to the 
information provided by LR tests and the Akaike information criterion. 
                                                 
4 The inclusion of the long-term interest rate instead of the short-term one is justified for its 
closer relationship with consumption and investment decisions. 
5 Compensation of civil servants plus other consumption expenditure items such as 
purchases of goods and services. 
6 It includes both current and capital transfers. More concretely, transfers include all 
expenditure items except public consumption, public investment and interest payments. 
7 GDP volumes and deflator have been taken from the Quarterly National Accounts 
(National Institute of Statistics, INE) while the three-year bond rate has been obtained from 
the Banco de España database. The quarterly fiscal variables were taken from Estrada et al. 
(2004), which were estimated applying monthly and quarterly official fiscal indicators on a 
cash basis to the official ESA-95 annual account data. 
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    In order to account for the effects on private consumption and investment, 
two alternative 6-variable VAR models were used. They included the 
original five variables of the baseline specification plus one of both private 
sector variables. 
 
2.2  Identification of fiscal policy shocks 
The reduced-form residuals have little economic significance in that they 
are linear combinations of structural shocks. In particular, following 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004), the reduced-form residuals 
of the gt and tt  equations, 
g
t u  and 
t
t u , can be thought of as linear 
combinations of three types of shocks: a) The automatic responses of 
spending and net taxes to GDP, price and interest rate innovations, b) 
systematic discretionary responses of fiscal policy to the macro variables in 
the system, and c) random discretionary fiscal policy shocks, taken as the 
truly uncorrelated structural fiscal policy shocks. Thus, the reduced-form 
























t e e u u u u + + + + = , , , , β α α α                (2b) 
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t e , 
t
t e ) are the structural orthogonal shocks of government 
expenditure and net taxes
8, respectively. 
    In particular, we are interested in analysing the effects of the structural 
discretionary fiscal shocks, 
g
t e  and 
t
t e , on the rest of the variables of the 
system, for which estimations for the αi,j’s and βi,j’s in (2) are needed. The 
use of quarterly variables allows for setting the discretionary 
contemporaneous response of government expenditure or net taxes to GDP, 
prices or interest rate innovations to zero in that it typically takes longer 
than three months to approve and implement new measures. Therefore, the 
coefficients αi,j’s in (2a) and (2b) only reflect the automatic responses of 
fiscal variables to innovations in the rest of the variables of the system, the 
first component mentioned above.  
    Given that interest payments on government debt are excluded from the 
definitions of expenditure and net taxes, the semi-elasticities of these two 
fiscal variables to interest rate innovations, i.e. αg,r  and αt,r, were set to zero. 
While this assumption appears justified for government expenditure and 
plays no role when analysing its effects, it is slightly more controversial for 
net taxes
9.  
                                                 
8 Similarly, 
y
t e , 
p
t e , 
r
t e  would be the structural orthogonal shocks derived from the 
reduced-form residuals in the other three equations related to activity, prices and interest 
rate, respectively. 
9 The income tax-base includes interest income as well as dividends, which covary 
negatively with interest rates. Nevertheless, the full set of effects of interest rate innovations 
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    Consider  now  equation  (2a).  Our choice of the items included in the 
definition of government expenditure, notably public consumption and 
investment, makes it hard to think about any automatic response of public 
expenditure to economic activity. Accordingly, we can set αg,y= 0. The case 
of the price elasticity is different, though. Some share of purchases of goods 
and services are likely to respond to the price level. In addition, the wage 
component is typically indexed to the CPI, even though indexation takes 
place with some delay. Thus, an eclectic approach was adopted and, 
following Perotti (2004) the price elasticity of government expenditure was 
set to -0.5. The relevance of this choice, however, seems very limited in 
that, as it will be explained ahead, setting this price elasticity to zero does 
not seem to affect the results significantly.  
    As for (2b), the output and price elasticities αi,j  are weighted averages of 
the elasticities of the different net-tax components, including transfers, 
computed on the basis of information like statutory tax rates and estimations 
of the contemporaneous response of the different tax-bases and, in the case 
of transfers, the relevant macroeconomic aggregate to GDP and price 
changes. In general, the contemporaneous output elasticity of net taxes can 
be calculated as: 
                                                                                                                            
on the different tax categories are very complex to analyse and, on the other hand, their 
contemporaneous effects are deemed to be very small. 
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B T y t i i i , , , ε ε α ∑ =         ( 3 )  
with  ∑ = i T T  being the level of net taxes
10, 
i i B T , ε  the elasticity of the i
th 
category of net taxes to its own tax base and  y Bi, ε  the GDP elasticity of the 
tax base of the i
th category of net taxes. The price elasticities for some 
components of net taxes were, however, obtained directly through 
econometric estimation, whereas others were calibrated. Appendix A 
explains in detail the procedure followed to obtain such elasticities. 
    Once the output and price elasticities have been estimated, the so-called 
“adjusted” fiscal shocks (u














t e e u u u u u + = + + − = , , , ,














t e e u u u u u + = + + − = , , , ,
, ) ( β α α α              (3b) 
    Some further assumptions are needed here and they depend on our view 
of the functioning of fiscal policy. If one believes that expenditure decisions 
are prior to tax ones, βg,t would be zero. Hence, 
g
t e  could be recovered 
directly from (3a) and use it in (3b) so as to estimate βt,g by OLS. 
Conversely, if tax decisions are deemed to come first, we would have to 
proceed symmetrically so as to get an estimate of βg,t. It could be quite 
difficult to find arguments that fully justify any of both orderings. 
Therefore, we decided to present our results on the basis that expenditure 
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comes first, i.e. βg,t = 0. Nevertheless, this choice does not seem to affect the 
main results in a substantial way
11, as it will be shown later on.  
    Since we are interested in studying the effects of fiscal policy shocks, the 
ordering of the remaining variables is immaterial to the results. 
Accordingly, the reduced-form output residuals are assumed to be a linear 








t e u u u + + = , , γ γ        ( 4 )  
    By definition, some contemporaneous correlation between the reduced-
form residuals of the fiscal equations and 
y
t e  is expected. Hence (4) is 
estimated by instrumental variables, using the structural uncorrelated fiscal 
shocks 
g
t e  and 
t
t e  as instruments for 
g
t u  and 
t












t e u u u u + + + = , , , γ γ γ       (5) 
can be estimated by using 
g
t e , 
t
t e  and 
y
t e  as instruments. And finally, the 












t e u u u u u + + + + = , , , , γ γ γ γ      (6) 
can be estimated accordingly once 
p
t e  has been recovered.  
    As a result, the innovation model can be written as  
                                                                                                                            
10 The Ti’s are positive in the case of taxes and negative in the case of transfers. 
11 In fact, this is mainly due to the low and non-significant correlation between expenditure 
and net-tax shocks. 
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t t V U Β = Γ          ( 7 )  
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1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1







      (9) 
Accordingly, the reduced-form residuals are linear combinations of the 
orthogonal structural shocks of the form: 
  t t V U Β Γ =
−1                       (10) 
   Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients for the baseline model. All of 
them have the expected sign except γr,y, that yielded a negative value. Given 
that it turned out to be non-significant, it was decided to fix it to zero. 
    Finally, we are also interested in characterising the responses of some 
GDP components such as private consumption and private investment, for 
which these variables are added in turn to the VAR. The identification of the 
resulting 6-variable VARs was achieved by departing from (8) and (9) and 
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estimating the contemporaneous bi-directional interaction between GDP and 
its respective component
12.   
 
3  The effects of government expenditure shocks 
3.1  The baseline specification 
Figure 1 displays the responses of the endogenous variables to a positive 
expenditure shock
13. It should be first highlighted that the expenditure shock 
turns out to be very persistent and only becomes insignificant after almost 
five years. The high persistence of public expenditure shocks is in line with 
the existing evidence for other OECD countries (Perotti, 2004; Galí et al., 
2003).  
    The increase of government expenditure raises GDP, which peaks in the 
3
rd quarter after the shock. The cumulative output multipliers
14 are slightly 
above one in the first two years: 1.31 and 1.33 in the fourth and eight 
quarters after the shock, respectively (see Table 3). These multipliers are 
broadly in line with previous studies for the case of Spain (De Castro, 
2005), although they are on the high side compared with the values obtained 
                                                 
12 Another possibility would be to replace GDP by one of both components and re-estimate 
Γ accordingly. However, both approaches yield very similar results. 
13 The responses of private consumption and private investment obtained from a 6-variable 
VAR are also depicted. In all cases, impulse responses are reported for ten years and the 
one-standard deviation confidence bands have been obtained by Monte Carlo integration 
methods with 500 replications. 
14 The cumulative dynamic multiplier at a given quarter is obtained as the ratio of the 
cumulative response of GDP and the cumulative response of government expenditure. 
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for other OECD countries (Fatás and Mihov, 2001; Mountford and Uhlig, 
2002; Perotti, 2004; Galí et al., 2003). The sign and magnitude of these 
VAR short-term responses are also consistent with the short-term 
multipliers obtained with macroeconometric models. In particular, Estrada 
et al. (2004) report output multipliers of government spending in Spain of 
1.2 at the end of the first year and 1.4 after eight quarters. 
        In the longer term, however, our results show that the GDP response 
dwindles steadily and becomes significantly negative after four years. This 
evidence is also in line with the negative medium-term output responses 
obtained for some other OECD countries (Perotti, 2004; Neri, 2001; 
Mountford and Uhlig, 2002). 
    As regards the impact on other fiscal variables, net-tax revenues rise and 
remain positive and significant for approximately twelve quarters, turning 
negative in the medium term, following the decline in economic activity. 
The initially positive response of net-tax collections offsets the increase of 
public expenditure in the quarters following the shock. In the medium term, 
however, a persistent deterioration in the primary balance shows up as 
expected. 
    Higher  government  expenditure  also brings about a persistent positive 
response of the GDP deflator, which implies higher inflation in the quarters 
following the shock. This is a potentially important result since, although De 
18
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Castro (2005) already obtains evidence of this kind for Spain, this is far 
from being a general finding in VAR analysis. In fact, the evidence from 
this literature on the effects of government spending shocks on prices or 
inflation is rather mixed
15. Our results are, in any case, consistent with those 
derived from macromodels for Spain, which find relatively large positive 
effects on inflation stemming from government expenditure shocks (Estrada 
et al., 2004; Henry et al., 2004). 
    Likewise, interest rates increase persistently following a positive shock to 
government expenditure
16.  While the positive response of the interest rate 
in the short term might be due to higher demand and inflationary pressures, 
the persistent deterioration of the primary balance could contribute to 
sustain the interest rate above its baseline values. Moreover, the real interest 
rate
17 rises. Such increase is significant on average over the first three years 
after the shock, thereby helping to drag economic activity.  
                                                 
15 For the US, Fatás and Mihov (2001) and Mountford and Uhlig (2002) show negative 
effects on prices after a positive government spending shock, while Perotti (2004) finds an 
initial positive impact and negative effects thereafter on the CPI over the period 1961-2000; 
for the sub-period starting in 1980, the effects (albeit not significant) are instead positive 
after one, twelve and twenty quarters and negative after four quarters. Edelberg et al. (1998) 
find a negative effect after an initial positive effect, Neri (2001) reports no significant 
effects and Canzoneri et al. (2002) find a temporary rise in inflation after a brief decline. 
For other OECD countries, Perotti (2004) finds positive effects of government spending on 
prices in Germany, the UK and Australia, and negative, albeit small, in Canada. Marcellino 
(2002) reports minor and not statistically significant effects on inflation in Germany, Italy 
and Spain and a positive and significant effect in France in the short term. For a summary 
of all these results see Henry et al. (2004). 
16 In contrast, Perotti (2004) finds no clear-cut evidence in either direction on this issue. 
17 The real interest rate is obtained as the difference between the nominal interest rate and 
the observed annual inflation rate in the same period. We are aware that this definition may 
be controversial from a theoretical point of view in that it implicitly assumes that expected 
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        As for the GDP components, the augmented VAR yields patterns of 
response for private consumption and investment quite similar to that of 
GDP, going up in the quarters following the shock and declining in the 
longer term. Thus, private consumption reaches its peak in the 5
th quarter, 
whereas private investment peaks somewhat earlier. These short-run effects 
are again consistent with those derived from macro models for Spain and, as 
regards consumption, with most of the VAR evidence for other countries 
(Fatás and Mihov, 2001; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Gali et al., 2003). The 
evidence for private investment is however more mixed, with some papers 
showing negative responses of this variable to an exogenous increase in 
government spending. 
 
3.2  The effects of different public expenditure components 
In order to account for the different effects on economic activity stemming 
from public consumption expenditure and public investment, aggregate 
expenditure is replaced in the VAR by either component in turn in both the 
baseline and augmented VARs. Figure 2 shows the corresponding impulse 
response functions. 
    Neither public consumption nor investment shocks appear too persistent. 
In both cases, GDP increases and peaks in the third quarter. The GDP 
                                                                                                                            
inflation equals observed inflation. Nevertheless, we consider that it can represent an 
20
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response to a public consumption shock becomes significantly negative 
from the fourth quarter onwards. This fall is also observed in the responses 
of private consumption and investment, which reproduce output movements 
quite closely. Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that main culprit for the GDP 
decline is the wage bill component of public consumption
18.  
    In contrast, the positive response of GDP to public investment shocks is 
of significantly lower magnitude
19, although it takes more time, around 
eight quarters, to fade away. Thereafter, the GDP response becomes non-
significant. In the same vein, private consumption and investment show 
positive responses in the first two years after the shock.  
    Finally, all expenditure items entail positive short-term price responses. 
However, in the case of increases in the wage bill, this positive response 
fades away quickly as a result of the negative effects on economic activity.    
 
4  The effects of net taxes 
4.1  The baseline specification 
Figure 3 shows the responses following an increase of net taxes. Around 
70% of the initial shock disappears after four quarters, although the 
                                                                                                                            
acceptable approximation. 
18 These results are consistent with the hypothesis that public wage increases may exert 
upward pressure on the equilibrium wage, leading to lower profits and investment (Alesina 
et al., 2002). 
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response remains significant until the end of the third year. Higher revenues 
encourage government spending, which increases significantly after 2 
quarters and remains significant for four years. Such an increase in 
government expenditure is high enough to eventually offset the rise in net 
taxes, for which the initial improvement of the primary budget balance 
phases out over three years and deteriorates thereafter. Thus, on a cumulated 
basis, the primary balance rises until the 12
th quarter or so and fades 
thereafter. 
    This  deterioration  of  the  public deficit in the long term following an 
increase in taxes is in accordance with previous evidence on the existence of 
a bias towards deficit in public sector’s size in Spain. In addition, the 
significant responses of either fiscal variable after shocks to the other one 
are also compatible with the existing empirical evidence of bi-directional 
causality between public revenues and expenditure (De Castro et al., 2004). 
    The GDP response to the tax shock, although positive due to the parallel 
increase of government expenditure, is largely non-significant in the first 
years after the shock. Expectedly, however, the response becomes negative 
in the medium term
20. As in the case of expenditure shocks, net-tax shocks 
                                                                                                                            
19 Nevertheless, the correct way to address the ability of stimulating economic activity is by 
means of output, consumption and investment multipliers, since the size of the response by 
itself is little informative.  
20 The international evidence on this issue is mixed. Mountford and Uhlig (2002), 
Marcellino (2002) and Canzoneri et al. (2002) find no significant results, while Neri (2001) 
shows negative effects on output following a positive tax shock. Furthermore, the sign and 
22
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yield positive and persistent effects on nominal and real interest rates. In this 
respect, the persistently higher interest rates might be helping to amplify the 
negative effects on activity derived from higher taxes.  
        As far as GDP components are concerned, private consumption and 
investment responses, in general, mimic the GDP’s one. Some slight 
differences can be observed, though, especially in the short-term behaviour. 
Specifically, while private consumption rises in the short term, the response 
of private investment is non significant. Despite this initial difference, clear 
negative responses in the medium term arise in both cases.  




4.2  The effects of different net-tax components 
As in the case of government expenditure items, net-tax components are 
found to have different effects on economic variables (see Figure 4). In sum, 
                                                                                                                            
size of output responses in Perotti (2004) varies widely depending on the country and 
period considered. For instance, in the post-1980 period he obtains positive short-term 
output responses to net-tax shocks too. 
21 The international evidence on this effect is again rather mixed, Mountford and Uhlig 
(2002) find that a net-revenue shock has a negligible effect on prices in the US when 
controlling for the business cycle and for monetary policy shocks, while in Canzoneri et al. 
(2002) the inflation response to a net-tax increase is negative, although very small, after an 
initial minor positive effect. Marcellino (2002) reports non-significant effects on inflation 
of positive tax shocks in France, Germany and Spain, while inflation significantly increases 
in Italy in the short run. Perotti (2004) finds that, especially in the post-1980 period, the 
impact of a tax shock on prices is very small, typically negative or zero, while after three 
years there is evidence of a positive effect in UK and Australia, although only in the latter 
is the effect sizeable. 
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shocks to indirect taxation seem to involve no clear effects on economic 
activity, whereas shocks to direct taxation are clearly contractionary in the 
medium term
22. Moreover, shocks to social security contributions also drag 
economic activity in the short term
23.  
        As for the effects on prices, increases of indirect taxes involve, as 
expected, positive price responses, whereas shocks to direct taxes do not 
appear to have significant effects. These two results seem to fit well with the 
existing evidence provided by simulations with macromodels (Henry et al., 
2004). Prices fall, however, in response to a shock to social security 
contributions, which seems to be explained by the subdued economic 
activity in the first quarters following the shock.  
 
5  Robustness checks 
In order to test to what extent the results presented above are conditioned by 
the assumptions made on some coefficients in matrixes Γ and Β defined in 
section 2 some alternative specifications were tried. The first one has to do 
with possibly the most controversial assumption in the identification 
process: the ordering of fiscal variables. As pointed out before, it is difficult 
                                                 
22 This result is rather intuitive and differs from De Castro (2005). In this respect, the 
identification scheme adopted here appears more accurate in order to account for the effects 
of net taxes and, in particular, their breakdown.   
23 According to the responses in Figure 4, shocks to social security contributions yield 
positive output effects after five years, which turns out to be rather counter-intuitive. 
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to justify that expenditure decisions are prior to tax ones or the opposite. In 
this regard, De Castro et al. (2004) show that, depending on the period 
under scrutiny, the direction of causality between revenues and expenditure 
in Spain varies. Accordingly, we decided to re-estimate under the alternative 
assumption that taxes come first, which implies imposing βt,g = 0 and 
estimate βg,t in (3.a) by OLS.  
    Since the reduced-form residuals in the expenditure and net-tax equations 
showed low and non-significant correlation, the differences with the 
baseline VAR results, if any, were minimal. As a matter of fact, none of the 
variables under analysis showed different response profiles and the output 
multipliers were almost identical. 
    Setting the price elasticity of government expenditure exogenously, in our 
case αg,p = -0.5, may appear controversial too. In order to have an idea of the 
sensitivity of our results to this assumption, an alternative specification 
setting αg,p = 0.0 was run. As in the former case, our results appear quite 
robust to different parameterisations in that no significant differences were 
perceived with respect to the benchmark specification. 
    Furthermore, we were interested in checking the sensitivity of our results 
to different output and price elasticities of net taxes. Firstly, we run the 
model setting εt,y = 0.4 exogenously. Secondly, a similar exercise was 
                                                                                                                            
However, the forecasting limitations of this methodology for such long horizons advise 
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carried out with εt,y = 0.4 jointly with εt,p = 0.5, instead of the estimated 0.78 
in the baseline VAR. In both cases the results were almost identical to the 
baseline specification and the output multipliers of government expenditure 
were exactly the same as those reported in the first row of Table 3. 
    The baseline specification was also estimated with detrended variables, 
for which Hodrick-Prescott trends were used (with λ=1600). Although in 
this case the numbers change, the main conclusions remain valid. In 
particular, expenditure shocks lead to higher prices, interest rates and net 
taxes. Moreover, GDP always increases in the short term and tends to 
decline after some quarters. Furthermore, following a net-tax shock, prices 
fall, expenditure rises and output increases in the short term and declines in 
the medium term. 
    Finally, in order to check the stability of our results by sub-samples, we 
re-estimated the model for the period between 1992:1 and 2004:4. With this 
sub-sample the estimated discretionary fiscal shocks seem to have been less 
persistent, with real effects of significantly lower magnitude and largely 
non-significant. Moreover, the deficit bias of the public sector’s size does 
not show up, which could be due to the consolidation process that spread 
along most of the period covered by this sub-sample. Nevertheless, the 
                                                                                                                            
against drawing conclusions from this result. 
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small number of observations leads to very imprecise estimates, for which 
the latter results have to be taken with the greatest care. 
 
6  An application to the analysis of the contribution of discretionary 
fiscal policy to GDP growth since the mid-nineties 
Since the beginning of the 80s fiscal policy in Spain can be characterised by 
broadly two distinct periods. On the one hand, during the 80s and until the 
mid-90s the public sector size increased dramatically. That process was 
closely associated to the building up of the Welfare State and the 
modernisation of the tax system. This period was also characterised by the 
presence of persistent public deficits and growing public debt levels. On the 
other hand, during the second half of the nineties a steady expenditure-based 
consolidation process was followed, according to which the public deficit 
was cut from 6.6% of GDP in 1995 to a balanced budget in 2003 (Figure 5).  
    In relation to this second period, as aforementioned in the introduction, a 
recent strand of the literature has concentrated on analysing the impact of 
fiscal consolidations on economic activity, providing some evidence of 
short-run positive growth effects under certain circumstances. In this 
context, the results presented in the previous sections of this paper can be 
used to estimate the contribution of fiscal policy, or more precisely of the 
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structural discretionary fiscal shocks, to economic growth during the 
consolidation process.  
    Figure 6 shows the annual average contributions of fiscal shocks to GDP 
growth since 1994. Specifically, we have simulated the contribution of the 
fiscal shocks starting in 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002, respectively, up 
to the end of the sample period
24. Hence, the vertical distance between the 
line that incorporates, for example, the effects of the shocks since 1996 and 
the line with the shocks since 1998 measures the growth contribution due to 
the shocks that take place in 1996 and 1997. In other words, the vertical 
distance between both lines is attributed to the lagged effect of the non-
common shocks of these two periods. The same applies for the rest of the 
curves.  
   According to these simulations, during the first years of the consolidation 
process, namely between 1996 and 1998, the fiscal contraction dragged 
GDP growth slightly, mainly as a result of the contractionary effects of 
expenditure shocks, partially offset by the expansionary impact of net-tax 
shocks. As regards 1998-2000, the fiscal shocks in this period had broadly 
                                                 
24 We departed from the estimated parameters of the VAR, the estimated innovation model 
described in (10) and the observed lagged values of the system variables. Thus, when the 
structural shocks are set to zero, the VAR parameters and the lagged values of the variables 
yield a given path for the different variables of the system, whereas applying a set of 
estimated structural shocks starting in a given year will yield different values for the system 
variables from that year onwards. Accordingly, the differences obtained for the variables 
are attributed to the differential element between both simulations, notably the non-zero 
structural shocks in the second case. The similar reasoning applies when comparing two 
sets of structural shocks starting in different points in time.  
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neutral effects on GDP growth, while the observed positive contribution of 
fiscal policy stems from the lagged effects of the fiscal shocks in the former 
period. Indeed, the fiscal shocks between 1996 and 1998, mainly on the 
expenditure side (see figure 6), at the outset of the expenditure-based fiscal 
consolidation, are estimated to have contributed positively to GDP growth 
in the period 1998-2000 as compared with the shocks from 1998 onwards. 
Finally, the lagged effect of net-tax shocks from 1998 to 2000 have posted a 
positive contribution in 2002 and 2003 that, added to the lagged effects of 
spending shocks, yielded a positive effect on output growth of around 0.2 
percentage points per year. Finally, the growing contribution to growth in 
2004 can be attributed to the expenditure shocks, which were mainly 
associated to the robust growth of public consumption.  
    In sum, our simulations confirm the view that the consolidation process, 
defined as the cumulated structural fiscal policy shocks, did not involved 
large negative costs in terms of output in the Spanish case. In fact, the 
estimated contribution to GDP growth of the fiscal policy shocks 
implemented since 1996 has been, on average, close to zero
25. 
    Finally, our results can also be used to define the stance of the fiscal 
policy in relation with the position of the economic cycle. For this purpose, 
figure 7 compares the estimated shocks to the primary fiscal balance, taken 
                                                 
25 Exactly 0.08 percentage points per year on average. 
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as a measure of the discretionary fiscal policy stance, with the output gap of 
the Spanish economy, calculated with the H-P filter (with λ=1600). A 
positive correlation between both should be interpreted as a counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy. According to this figure, the fiscal policy stance appears to 
have been counter-cyclical on average until the mid-eighties, but it became 
pro-cyclical in the early nineties. Between 1998 and 2004 the fiscal policy 
stance recovered its counter-cyclical nature, with the exception of the year 
2003, when the primary and headline budget balances kept improving 
despite the economic slowdown
26. 
 
7  Conclusions 
This paper aims at deepening on the knowledge of the economic effects of 
fiscal policy shocks in Spain by using a VAR methodology. Our results can 
be summarized as follows: 1) output multipliers of government expenditure 
are found to be slightly above one in the short term, while negative in the 
longer term; 2) net-tax increases often produce positive although small and 
hardly significant short-term output responses, while negative in the 
medium term; 3) government expenditure shocks yield significant effects on 
prices of the same sign; 4) net-tax increases yield negative short-term price 
                                                 
26 Galí and Perotti (2003) conclude that fiscal policy in Spain has become more 
countercyclical in the post-Maastricht period. While this is in accordance with our results 
for the period between 1998 and 2002, it contrasts with our findings for the period between 
the Maastricht Treaty and 1997. 
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responses; 5) shocks to fiscal variables produce significant responses of 
nominal interest rates; 6) both government expenditure and net-tax increases 
generate public deficits in the medium term due to their endogenous 
responses, and; 7) Responses of GDP or prices may differ significantly 
depending on the spending or tax component considered.  
    Two main policy conclusions could be drawn from these results. Firstly, 
fiscal policy is able to stimulate economic activity through expenditure 
expansions at the cost of higher inflation and public deficits and lower 
output in the medium term. Secondly, attempts to achieve fiscal 
consolidation by increasing the tax burden might fail to succeed and are 
likely to involve even higher deficits in the future. Last, but not least, such a 
policy might slow economic activity down in the medium term. 
    The application of the previous results to the analysis of fiscal policy in 
Spain since the mid-nineties shows that the consolidation process, from a 
medium-term perspective, does not seem to have involved costs in terms of 
output growth. Rather, its contribution to GDP growth appears to have been 
clearly positive in some periods. Furthermore, the stance of fiscal policy has 
become more counter-cyclical since the late nineties.  
    Two final caveats are in order. Firstly, it should be taken into account that 
VARs are a useful forecasting tool in the short term. In this respect, our 
results, mainly those stemming from public spending shocks, are broadly 
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consistent with a standard Keynesian view of the functioning of the 
economy. However, their accuracy declines at longer horizons. Therefore, 
the conclusions obtained regarding the long-term responses to fiscal policy 
shocks have to be interpreted with caution. Secondly, the econometric 
model employed in this paper ensures the symmetry of the responses to 
shocks of equal absolute value with opposite signs. However, there are good 
reasons to believe that the real economy may not be symmetric and, 
accordingly, reactions to fiscal expansions might be of very different 
magnitude to fiscal retrenchments, with the size of the difference depending 
on a complex set of variables, including the initial state of public finances. 
This potential asymmetries cannot, however, be captured by our estimates. 
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Appendix A: Construction of output and price elasticities 
In order to calculate the output and price elasticities needed for the 
identification of the VAR model we basically follow the OECD 
methodology proposed in Giorno et al. (1995), which focuses on four tax 
categories, i.e. personal income tax, corporate income tax, indirect taxes and 
social security contributions. In addition, they consider the elasticity of 
transfer programmes, notably unemployment benefits.  
    According  to  this  methodology,  the output elasticity of the personal 
income tax can be obtained as: 
y emp emp w w tdirh y tdirh , , , , ) 1 ( ε ε ε ε + =                 (A.1) 
where  w tdirh, ε  is the elasticity of personal income tax revenues to the real 
wage, measured by the compensation per employee,  emp w, ε  is the 
employment elasticity of the real wage and  y emp, ε  the GDP elasticity of 
employment. Analogously, the output elasticity of social security 
contributions is: 
y emp emp w w ss y ss , , , , ) 1 ( ε ε ε ε + =                   (A.2) 
with  w ss, ε  being the elasticity of social contributions to the real wage.  
    The output elasticity of corporate income tax revenues stems from: 
y gos gos tdirc y tdirc , , , ε ε ε =                     (A.3) 
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where  gos tdirc, ε  is the elasticity of tax revenues to the gross operating surplus 
and  y gos, ε  the output elasticity of the gross operating surplus. In the same 
fashion, given that the main tax base for indirect tax collections is private 
consumption, the output elasticity of indirect taxes is obtained as: 
y c c tind y tind , , , ε ε ε =                     (A.4) 
where  c tind, ε  and  y c, ε  are the elasticity of indirect taxes to private 
consumption and the output elasticity of private consumption, respectively. 
    Since we employ data on a national accounts basis, collection lags should 
not affect the elasticities to the respective tax-bases significantly. Hence, 
these have been taken from Van den Noord (2000) and Bouthevillain et al. 
(2001). The output elasticities of the relevant tax bases were, however, 
obtained from econometric estimation on a quarterly basis. In general, the 
general equation used for estimating these elasticities was: 
t t i
i
t Y Ln t B Ln η ε δ γ + ∆ + + = ∆ ) (   ) (                 (A.5) 
where B
i is the relevant tax base for the i
th tax category and εi is the output 
elasticity of such tax base. These equations, given the likely 
contemporaneous correlation between the independent variable and the error 
term, were estimated by instrumental variables. However, if the variables B
i 
and Y are cointegrated, (A.5) contains a specification error. In this case, the 
following ECM specification would be preferable: 
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where λ measures the long-term relationship between both variables and εi 
the short-term contemporaneous elasticity we are interested in.  
   It is worth mentioning that the estimated employment elasticity of the real 
wage,  emp w, ε , turned out to be negative although non-significant. Then, it 
was decided to set εw,emp=0.  
    Information on the output elasticity of net transfers is more limited than 
in the former cases. Although unemployment benefits respond to the 
underlying economic conditions, many expenditure programmes do not 
have built-in conditions that make them respond contemporaneously to 
employment or output. Therefore, recalling Perotti’s argument, an output 
elasticity of net transfers of -0.2 has been assumed.  
        The procedure followed to obtain the price elasticities was slightly 
different to output elasticities. Those for total direct taxes and social security 
contributions were directly estimated, yielding values of 0.4 and -0.2, 
respectively. Indirect taxes are typically proportional. Hence, following 
Perotti (2002), a price elasticity of 0 was assumed. Finally, although transfer 
programmes are indexed to the CPI, indexation occurs with a considerable 
lag. Thus, the price elasticity of transfers was set to -1. Table A.1 shows the 
resulting output and price elasticities. 
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Table 1: Effects of fiscal policy shocks in selected VAR studies (1) 
 










Expenditure shock – US               
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 1947-1997 +* +  +*  +*         
Perotti (2004) 1961-2000  +* +  +*  +*  +* –  –*  –* 
Perotti  (2004)  1980-2000  + +  –  –* + –  +  + 
Neri (2001) 1965-1996  +* +* –  –  +  +  +  + 
Fatás and Mihov (2001) 1960-1996  +* +* +*  +*  –* –* –*  –* 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998) 
1948-1996 
+* +* +*   +* +* –   
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) 
1947-1994 
+* +* +       
Mountford and Uhlig (2002) 1955-2000  + +  –  –  – –* –*  – 
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002)  +* +* +  –  +  +  
Expenditure shock – Germany               
Perotti (2004) 1961-2000  +* +* – +*  +* +* +*  +* 
Perotti (2004) 1980-2000  + –* –  –  + +* +*  + 
Marcellino (2002) 1981-2001  +* +*    –  –    
Revenue shock – US              
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 1947-1997 –* –* –* –         
Perotti (2004) 1961-2000  –* –* –* –* + – –* –* 
Perotti (2004) 1980-2000  –* – *  – –  –* –* – 
Neri (2001) 1965-1996  –* –* –* –*  –* –* –* –* 
Mountford and Uhlig (2002) 1955-2000  –* –* –* – +  + –  – 
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002)  –* –* –*    + –  –   
Revenue shock – Germany               
Perotti (2004) 1961-2000  –* –* –* – –  +* +  – 
Perotti (2004) 1980-2000  + –* –  –* –* –  –*  – 
Marcellino (2002) 1981-2001  – –      +  +    
 
* The value 0 is outside the region between the two one-standard error bands. 
(1) Source: Henry, J, P. Hernández de Cos and S. Momigliano (2004).  
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Table 2: Estimates of Β and Γ in the benchmark specification 









βt,g = 0.554 
         (1.83) 
    αt,y = 0.62  αt,p = 0.78 
u
y  
γy,g = 0.103 
          (3.07) 
γy,t = -0.008 
          (-0.69) 
  
u
p   γp,g = 0.065 
          (2.83) 
γp,t = -0.014 
          (-1.94) 
γp,y = 0.055 
          (0.80) 
 
u
r   γr,g = 0.064 
          (1.66) 
γr,t = 0.023 
          (1.97) 
γr,y = -0.044  
          (-0.39) 
γr,p = 0.212 
          (1.21) 
Notes: t-ratios in brackets. The negative sign of γr,y is quite unexpected and lacks economic 
justification. Therefore, given that it was non-significant, it was decided to set γr,y = 0.0. 
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Table 3: Cumulative output multipliers to government expenditure 
shocks 
 Quarters 
Shock to:  4
th q  8
th q  12
th q  16
th q  20
th q 
Expenditure (Baseline VAR)  1.31 1.33 1.00 0.65 0.26 
Expenditure (Net taxes first)  1.31 1.37 1.06 0.74 0.40 
Expenditure (αg,p = 0)  1.30 1.32 0.97 0.61 0.21 
Public consumption  0.67 -0.33 -1.75 -4.02 -8.69 
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Table A.1: Output and price elasticities of net taxes 
     Output elasticities Price  elasticities 
εtdirh,w = 1.8  εw,emp = 0.0  εemp,y = 0.17  εtdirh,y = 0.17  εtdir,p = 0.40 
εss,w = 0.80      εss,y = 0.17  εss,p = -0.20 
εtdirc,gos = 1.0    εgos,y = 1.04  εtdirc,y = 1.04  
εtind,c = 1.0    εc,y = 0.30  εtind,y = 0.30  εtind,p = 0.0 
     εtransf,y = -0.20  εtransf,p = -1.0 
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Figure 2: Responses to shocks to government expenditure components 
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Figure 4: Responses to shocks to components of net taxes 
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Figure 6: Contribution of discretionary fiscal shocks to GDP growth 
since 1996 (annual averages) 
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